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I he National Labor Relations Board'sextension ofthe Weingarten^ decision,
granting the right to union representation at
pre-disciplinary interviews, to the nonunion
workplace was recently upheld by the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.- Section 7's,^ '
protection of concerted activity and the sym-
metrical protection of union and nonunion em-
ployees alike renders the decision sensible and
supportable. Nevertheless, closer examination
ofthe decision's consequences suggests that the
application ofthe Weingarten right in the non-
union workplace results in a distorted reflec-
tion ofthe right's application in the unionized
workplace. The situations are not mirror im-
ages. Thus, some adjustments to the interpre-
tation ofthe right in the nonunion workplace
are necessary to make it workable and effective.
SECTION 7 PROTECTIONS
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act
guarantees employees the right to engage in
concerted activity for the purpose of mutual aid
and protection.^ An employee exercising Sec-
tion 7 rights is shielded from adverse employer
actions, such as discipline or dischai'ge, as Sec-
tion 8(a)(l) deems such retaliatoiy action an
unfair labor practice.' Because Section 7 pro-
tects both union activity and "other concerted
activity," groups of nonunion employees enjoy
the rights and protections of Section 7, so long
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as the activity to be afforded protection is for the
mutual aid and protection of tlie employees.^
WEINGARTEN
ITie Supreme Court, in NERB v. ]. Weingarten,
Inc.,^ affirmed the Board's holding that an em-
ployer commits an unfair labor practice under
Section 8(a)(l) when it denies an employee's re-
quest for the presence ofa union representative
at an investigatoiy meeting which the employee
reasonably believes may result in disciplinai")' ac-
tion, l^ he Weingarten right, accoixling to the Court,
originates in Section 7, and tbe exercise tliereof
constitutes "concerted activity for tiie pru-pose of
... mutual aid and protection."^ In affinning die
Board, the Court held tbat the Board's holding
was a peiTiiissible construction of Section 7 and
the rights and protections gtiaranteed therein.
Limitations
While recognizing the employee's right to the
presence of a union representative at an in-
vestigatory interview, the Court articulated four
limitations on that right. First, tbe Weingarten
rigbt arises "only in situations wliere the em-
ployee requests representation." •' Second, the
right is limited to "sittiations in which the em-
ployee possesses a reasonable belief that the
interview may result in disciplinaiy action."'"
Third, the employee's exercise of the
Weingarten. right may not "interfere with legiti-
mate employer prerogatives."" Thus, the
employer may offer the employee the choice
of attending tbe intei"view unaccompanied, or
"foregoing any benefit" of an inten'iew while
the employer carries on the inqtiiry without
interviewing the employee.'- Finally, although
the employee has the rigbt to have a union
repi'esentative present, the employer has no
corollaiy obligation to bargain with such rep-
resentative.'-^ The Board has since held, how-
ever, that the representative must be afforded
the opportunity to participate in the inter-
view.'^  In the Board's view, the Court clearly
contemplated that the representative's role was
to provide assistance and counsel to the em-
ployee facing disciplinaiy action.
Remedy
Reasoning that an employer shotild not be re-
quired to reinstate an employee even in the event
that the employee's WeingaHen rights arc violated,
the Board has held that the applicable remedy
for a WeingaHen violation is a cease and desist
order.'"* Ifthe employee is terminated for exer-
cising the rigbt, however, rather than for the
underlying conduct that led to the investigation
in which the right was violated, reinstatement
and back pay are appropriate remedies."'
WEINCARTEN IN
NONUNION WORKPLACES
Pre-£pf/epsy Foundation cases
Weingarten involved represented employees.
Becatise the Board and the Court based the
Weingarten right upon the Section 7 statutory
protections afforded to both represented and
unrepresented employees, the Board was even-
tually faced with the difficult question of
whether the Weingarten rigbt is enjoyed by un-
represented employees as well.^ ^
The Board first addressed this question in
1982 in Materials Research,}'^ Concluding that
the benefits and protections ofthe Weingarten
right cotild be realized in the absence of a
union representative, the Board deterinined
that an unrepresented employee has the right
to request the assistance ofa fellow employee
in the situations contemplated in Weingarten.
By 1985, a change in Board membership re-
sulted in a re-interpretation ofthe applicabilit)'
of Weingarten rights in the nonunion setting. In
Sears, Roebuck & Co., the Board determined that
it had misinterpreted Section 7 of the Act and
that, in the absence ofa recognized union, the
Act could not be interpreted to provide
Weingarten rights.''' Three years later, the Board
revisited the issue in E.F Du Pont de Netnours &
Co., changing its rationale but reaching the same
result.-" In Du Pont, the Board reasoned that
the Act did not mandate the conclusion that
nonunion employees have no WeingaHen rights,
but decided that die balance of interests between
nianagenient and labor favored denial of the
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right because "many of the useful objectives tively to find the discharge of Borgs unlawftil.
listed by the Court [in Weingarten] either are
much less likely to be achieved or are irrelevant"
in the nonunion setting."-'
Epilepsy Foundation
Over ten years later, the Board revisited the
issue again, finding "compelling reasons" to
reverse the Du Pont decision. Epilepsy Founda-
tion of Northeast Ohio-- involved the termina-
tion of two employees. Both employees, Borgs
and Hasan, sent a menioranclum to their su-
pervisor stating that they no longer required
his supervision over their project and a sub-
sequent memo to an- — •
other officer of the
Foundation. Borgs was
fired for refusing to
meet with employer
representatives without
his coworker, Hasan,
present.^'' Hasan met
with the employer
without representation
and was terminated for
insubordination aris-
ing out of his drafting
and delivery of the
meniorandum and
subsequent refusal to ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
sign performance evaluations.
Determining that the Weingarten right is en-
joyed by the unrepresented as well as tbe rep-
resented employee, and holding that Du Pont
was inconsistent with the NLRA and the Su-
preme Court's decision in Weingarten, the Board
overruled Du Pont and returned to the ratio-
nale of Matetials Research}'^ Thus, under Epi-
lepsy Foundation, an employee in a nonunion
environment has the right to have a coworker
present at an investigatory interview that the
employee reasonably believes may result in dis-
ciplinaiy action.-^ The Epilepsy Foundation right
enjoyed by nonunion employees is similarly lim-
ited by the constraints enunciated by the Cotirt
in Weingarten .^^' Finding that application of the
Weingarten rule would not work a manifest in-
justice, the Board applied its decision retroac-
In support of its decision, tbe Board noted that
there was no evidence in the record to suggest
that the employer was relying on the state of
Board law when it took action against Borg.
Applying the lTile sen'ed to "correct effects of
the imposition of discipline on an employee for
availing himself of the right to engage in pro-
tected activity, and thus sewes the purpose of
promoting the right of employees to engage in
concerted activity for mutual aid and protec-
tion," said the Board.-"
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cireuit af-
firmed the Boairl's decision in November, 2001 .''^
———— —- Recognizing tliat it must
A REQUEST FOR A UNION
REPRESENTATIVE THAT DOES
NOT CAUSE UNREASONABLE
DELAY SHOULD BE PROTECTED
AND HONORED WHERE
ONE IS AVAILABLE, EVEN
IF IT MAY NOT BE THE
OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE EMPLOYEE.
affirm the Board's inter-
pretation ofthe Act "un-
less it conflicts with the
unambiguously ex-
pressed intent of the
Coiigi'ess or is otliei~wise
not a permissible con-
stiTiction ofthe statute,"
the D.C. Circuit upheld
the Board's extension of
WeingaHen rights to non-
union employees. '^' Be-
cause the Weingarten
right was held to be an
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ extension of Section 7,''"
the qtiestion of permissibility revolved around
whether the presence of a coworker at an inves-
tigatory intewiew which tlie nonunion employee
reasonably believes may result in disciplinaiy
action is concerted action for mutual aid and pro-
tection.'' 1 he court found no fault with the
Board's recognition tliat nonunionized employ-
ees share an interest in preventing unw^arranted
discipline. Thus, the Board's detemiination that
an employee's request for a coworker's presence
at an investigatoiy interview is concerted action
for mutual aid and protection was reasonable.''-
'Fhe court also agreed with the Board tbat sup-
port for the extension ofthe Weingarten right to
nonunionized workplaces is found in the
Weingarten decision itself •'•'
While affirming the Board's extension of tbe
Weingatien right to nonunionized workplaces.
WEINGARTEN RIGHTS IN NONUNION SETTINGS 91
the D.C. Circuit reversed the Board's retroac-
tive application of its holding. In applying the
new rule retroactively, said the court, the Board
violated the governing principle that when a
new law is substituted for an old law that was
"reasonably clear," the new law may only have
prospective effect so as to "protect the settled
expectations of those who had relied on the
preexisting loile."-'^  The court noted that the
Board's policy regarding Weingarten's applica-
tion was clear and unquestionable at tbe time
the dispute at issue arose—nonunionized em-
ployees did not enjoy the riglit.-^ ^ Considering
the clarity ofthe old nile, as well as the injus-
tice of holding the Foundation liable for what
were lawflil actions when they were taken, the
court refiised to enforce the Board's decision
on retroactivity.
The final issue decided by the court was
whether the Board erred in determining that
the Foundation's discbarge of Hasan was un-
lawful because he was engaged in protected
concerted activity. Finding that Flasaii articu-
lated no objection to any term or condition of
employment, but rather rejected supeiA-isory
authority and expressed his "feelings and opin-
ions," the court deemed the drafting and de-
livery of the memorandum an act of insubor-
dination rather than protected activity.^ '^  The
court found no evidence to support a "nexus
between the...nieiiio and any protected activ-
ity by Hasan concerning the terms and condi-
tions of his employment."'" Thus, his dis-
charge was lawful.
THE FUNHOUSE MIRROR
The constraints ai'ticulated by the Supreme Court
in Weingarten, and in subsequent interpretations
of the right by die Board, were fonnulated for
situations involving a union-rep re sen ted em-
ployee. AVliile certain of these limitations are
easily transferred to the nonunion setting, oth-
ers seem rather misplaced and diffictilt to apply
in the same manner as contemplated by the
Court in WeingaHen and by the Board. Although
there was a brief period when the Board applied
Weingarten to nonunion employees between the
decision in Materials Research Corp. and its rever-
sal three years later in Sears Roebuck, Co., none of
diese issues was addressed definitively by the
Board during that time period.
Representation by the union in a WeingaHen
interview involves assistance of a trained and
knowledgeable union representative, at least in
ideal circumstances. In a unionized workplace,
the union educates employees about tlieir rights,
including the Weingarten right. Tlie union has
an official role in the workplace and owes a duty
of fair representation to all employees. The ab-
sence of these factors in the nonunion workplace
does not make the representation right inappli-
cable, but it does necessitate consideration of
possible adjustments so that tlie right achieves
its purpose without unduly interfering with other
important interests in the workplace.
Reasonable belief regarding discipline
As stated above, tbe Weingaiten right is only ap-
plicable in situations in which the employee rea-
sonably believes an investigatoiy interview may
result in disciplinaiy action. The determination
of reasonableness is not based on the employee's
good faith. Nor is it based upon the employee's
subjective mindset or the employer's subjective
intent. Rather, it is based upon a reasonableness
standard determined by the objective factors of
the situation.-'" Consider, for example, the
Boaixl's decision m Equitable Gas Co.'^^ The Board
there stated that it made no difference whether
or not tbe iiiteiA'iew actually resulted in disciplin-
aiy action. What was determinative of reason-
ableness was whether the "employee concerned
could reasonably anticipate discipline as a pos-
sible result.""^" In the Equitable Gas Co. situation,
the Board found an employer's previous state-
ments indicating an intention to strictly follow
company guidelines adequate to cieate a reason-
able fear of disciplinaiy action.^' Following the
Board's rationale, it would appear that any in-
formation the employee is piivy to, such as tlie
employer's history of executing disciplinary ac-
tion, the employee's own histoiy of being disci-
plined, or previotis statements by the employer,
may provide evidence to satisfy the reasonable
basis test under Weingarten.
9 2 LABOR LAW JOURNAL
This aspect of Weingarten seems readily
transferable to the nonunion setting. While
the absence of a union may limit the
employee's knowledge regarding the
employer's disciplinary history, any existing
knowledge will determine whether the
employee's belief was reasonable.
Employee request
The Weingarten right arises only upon tbe
employee's request for representation, and an
employer has no duty to inform an employee of
the existence of such right. Tbe unrepresented
employee, generally less knowledgeable on tbe
applicability ofthe NLl^ and die protections
aflbixied by the Act, will likely remain uninformed
as to the WeingaHen. right and will fail to exercise
the right when necessary for protection. In the
nonunion workplace, the right will most likely
be asserted by unrepresented employees who are
involved in a union oiganizing campaign and
have been informed by the union abotit the right.
The Bomxl could enhance die value ofthe right
by requiring employer notice to employees, ei-
ther generally through posting ofa workplace
notice, or at tbe time ofthe inten iew. WHiile the
Board has not traditionally required notice of
rights in the absence of a finding that an em-
ployer or union has violated the Act, many em-
ployment law statutes enacted in more recent
years require some affirmative notice to employ-
ees of their rights. The likely assumption at the
time the NLR\was passed, when the percent-
age of union membership was much higher, was
tbat employees wotild be informed of their rights
by their unions. In the largely nonunion work-
force of today, such an assumption is unwar-
ranted. Anotice requirement also would remove
the risk to the employee who refused to partici-
pate in tlie interview without representation only
to find later, after discharge or discipline, diat
the Board deems the assessment that the inter-
view was likely to lead to discipline unreason-
able, thereby rendering the refijsal unprotected.
Even with the requirement of notice, tbe right
would impose little restraint on managerial free-
dom. The employer still retains the right to
forego the interview if it does notw'ish to pro-
ceed with a representative present. Ifthe em-
ployei' denies re]presentation and proceeds with-
out it, the cease and desist remedy is a small
price X.O pay. Only if die employer terminates
the employee for refi_ising to participate in the
inten'iew without I'epresentation is there risk
ofthe more substantial penalty of reinstatement
and back pay. The employer may always ter-
minate the employee for the underlying mis-
conduct if warranted. Where diere is no re-
quirement of just cause for termination, the
employer need only take care that the terniina-
Lion does nol run afoul of discrimination laws
or tbe NLRAs prohibition on termination for
engaging in imion or pi'otected concerted ac-
tivity. Moreover, notification would be consis-
tent with the NLRB's move toward requiring
notification of employee rights in other con-
texts, such as the right to refrain from union
membership and the right to object to expen-
ditures of union dues not germane to the union's
representational duties.'-
Chosen representative
Under Weingarten, the Board has held that if
the employee's chosen union representative is
unavailable but another is able to attend, tbe
employee must proceed with the available rep-
resentative.^-' Does the employee in the non-
union setting have the same obligation lo ac-
cept the presence of any representative—any
coworker—who is available? Further, it re-
mains tmcertain as to whether or not the un-
repiesented employee may request the pres-
ence ofa union official at an investigatory in-
terview before the union is selected as major-
ity representative, during an organizing cam-
paign for example, or where other employees
in the facility have union representation.
Weingarten made clear that the role of the
representative is greater than mere presence.
The representative is to provide assistance and
counsel to the employee facing possible disci-
plinaiy action. The denial of such assistance is
deemed a "serious violation of an employee's
individual right to mtitual aid and protection."^^
Attempting to clarify the representative's lole,
the Board has stated that the purpose of the
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representative is to provide the more "experi-
enced assistance" that a tinioii steward may be
able to offer.'^ '' The union representative may
clarify issues, bring otit the facts and policies at
issue in the intei-view, and provide assistance to
an employee who is unable to express herself^''
Considering the Court's holding that the
right contemplates more than the mere pres-
ence ofthe representative, and the Board's clari-
fication ofthe possible roles ofthe representa-
tive, it may be argued that the unrepresented
employee may need a particular coworker who
lias the requisite knowledge and skill to pro-
vide the type of assistance contemplated by the
Court and the Board. Certainly, requiring an
employee to accept the "assistance" of a co-
worker who may not possess the knowledge and
skill necessary for the realization of the
Weingarten rigbt could be constiTied as a denial
of the right—a denial the Court held to be a
"serious violation."'^ Taking into account the
employer's interest in a prompt investigation,
however, an unreasonable delay to wait for the
best representative will not likely be required.
Since most coworkers would be unable to ful-
fill the role described by the Board in South-
ivestern Bell, an employee may find it necessary
to have the presence of a union representative
in order to fully realize the right. In many cases,
denying the presence ofa union representative
if one is available may effectively render tbe
Weingarten right a right to the presence, and
not the assistance, ofa representative. A reqtiest
for a union representative that does not canse
unreasonable delay should be protected and
honored where one is available, even if it may
not be the official representative of the em-
ployee. Clearly, however, since the employer
has no obligation to bargain with the certified
representative in the unionized setting, there is
no obligation to bargain with the uncertified
representative in the nonunionized setting.
Employee waiver
It is clear from Weingarten that an employee may
forego the representation right at the time of the
interview by either failing to request a represen-
tative or deciding to proceed without a represen-
tative when tlie alternative is to relinquish the
opportunity for the inteiTiew. Tlie Supreme Court
has held that the Weingaiien right senses to pro-
tect the exercise ofthe flill fieedoni of association
and self-organization for the purpose of muaial
aid and protection—what the Court teiTned the
mostflindamental ptupose ofthe NLRA.*^  Even
though the Court found the existence of the
WeingaHen right in the "mutual aid and protec-
tion" language of Section 7, lower courts have in-
terpreted the right as an individual right. The
Fifth Circuit found the Weingarten right to be an
individual right based on the fact tiiat an employee
may waive the right by not invoking it, and held
that a union may contractually waive the
Weingarten right. ^ •' The Board subseqtiently
agreed that the union could waive the right. ^ "
After Epilepsy Foundation, it is questionable
whedier an unrepresented employee may con-
tractually waive Weingarten tights. The answer
to this question might depend on the interpre-
tation ofthe right. Ifthe Fifth Circuit's interpre-
tation were to prevail, then it would seem logical
that an employee could waive the Weingarten
right. Since the puipose ofthe right, as enunci-
ated by the Supreme Court, is the protection of
the employee's right to mutual aid and protec-
tion, die answer is uncertain. Although the Court
has held tliat a union may waive individual rights,
it may do so because the employees have had
the opportunity to join together and organize a
union for the purpose of mutual aid and protec-
tion. In other words, the purpose of Weingarten
has been realized at the time of the waiver. The
situation is completely different for tbe unrep-
resented employee. There is no tinion and thus
no organization for mutual aid and protection.
The WeingaHen right is a means for the nonmiion
employee to realize the protections of Section 7.
Under this analysis, because the employer can-
not require an employee to waive the right to
Section 7 protection, it would seem that requir-
ing an unrepresented employee to waive
Weingaiten rights would be prohibited as well.
Pay for the representative
In the unionized workplace, the collective bar-
gaining agreement usually will address whether
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employees will be paid for time spent on union ludoii of these issues. The employer would be
business and at w h^at rate. The agreement may privileged to disclose potentially defamatoiy
also specify how employees will be relieved to
perform union business to minimize disruption
of work. In the nonunion context, no collec-
tively-bargained agree-
ment exists to deal with
such issues. To avoid
the question, the em-
ployer may schedule die
inten'iew after work or
at another time that
would be unpaid and
limit work disruption.
Alternatively, the safest
course is for the em-
ployei' to follow any ex-
isting practice regard-
ing scheduling and pay-
ment for similar activi-
ties. Any differential
W H I L E THE ABSENCE
OF A U N I O N MAY LIMIT
THE EMPLOYEE'S KNOWLEDGE
REGARDING THE EMPLOYER'S
DISCIPLINARY HISTORY,
ANY EXISTING KNOWLEDGE
WILL DETERMINE WHETHER
THE EMPLOYEE'S BELIEF
WAS REASONABLE.
information to the union in its role as repre-
sentative ofthe employee in the interview. In
addition, the union has a duty to represent any
other employees in the
bargaining unit who
treatment for concerted
activity would certainly lead to an argument that Foundation is that a coworker representative
might be discussed in
tbe intei^iew. Because
of this duty, as well as
tlie democratic realities
of holding union office,
union representatives
have an incentive to use
information learned in
the investigation only
as necessaiy in their
representative role. A
coworker may have no
such incentive. Further,
one of the reasons for
the holding in Epilepsy
tlie employee was being penalized for engag-
ing in activity protected by the statute. For ex-
ample, the disciplinaiy interview might be
analogized to other work-related meetings.
Since the employee's presence is being re-
quested by a co-employee rather than the em-
ployer, the employer might plausibly contend
that it is not obliged to pay the co-employee for
time spent attending the meeting. The cost of
paying the co-employee for attending the in-
tewiew during work time, however, particularly
where the time can be determined by the em-
ployer, seems a small price to pay for avoiding
what could be a protracted legal dispute.
Defamation
Two potentially more difficult and somewhat
intertwined issues are the confidentiality ofthe
information revealed in the intei-view and the
risk of defamation claims. An investigatoiy
interview is likely to involve discussion of al-
legedly improper, if not illegal, actions by the
employee, which would damage his or ber
reputation. Where the representative is from
the certified union, the union's role eases reso-
may help protect against unfair discipline. To
sen'e that purpose, the representative will nec-
essarily need to discuss the facts underlying
the disciphne with others.
The right to representation as enunciated
in Fpilepsy Foundation, would seem to provide
the employer with several defenses to any
defamation claim. The privilege to commti-
nicate information should extend to the co-
worker representative by virtue of the deci-
sion. Since the privilege can be lost if the
employer acts with reckless disregard for the
truth or falsity ofthe statements, the employer
should always be cautious with respect to the
reliability of information that forms the basis
of an investigation. Caution is necessary re-
gardless of Epilepsy Foundation, however, for
any disciplinary action taken by the employer
and communicated to anyone poses a risk of
a defamation action if the privilege is lost.
Fpilepsy Foundation simply adds one additional
person to whom the communication is made.
Another possible argument should a defama-
tion issue arise, at least with respect to the
employee that is being investigated, is that
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the representative is an agent ofthe employee
and thus there has been no publication.
Confidentiality
The sensitive nature of any disciplinary in-
quiry gives rise to concerns about confiden-
tiality, both for the employee who is the sub-
ject of the investigatory interview and oth-
ers who might be discussed dtiring the in-
terview. The most problematic issue involves
investigation of sexual harassment claims.
An employee concerned about confidential-
ity of any acctisations may simply refrain
from requesting a representative or choos-
ing a trustworthy coworker An employer
concerned about confidentiality may forego
the interview ifthe employee insists on rep-
resentation. That may not be a realistic
option for an employer faced with a sexual
harassment allegation. Ifthe harasser and
subject of the interview is a supervisor, no
Weingarten right attaches to the interview as
supervisors are not covered by the NLRA,
but if the accused harasser is an employee,
he has a Weingarten right in an investigatory
interview if he reasonably believes that it
might result in disciplinary action. Since the
employer may be liable under Title VII for
sexual harassment by a coworker if the em-
ployer knew about the harassment and failed
to take appropriate remedial action, an ac-
cusation of harassment will trigger an obli-
gation to investigate.
The confidentiality at greatest risk is that
of the victim of the harassment. Employees
who are sexually harassed frequently are re-
luctant to report the harassment. The neces-
sary presence of a representative for the ac-
cused may exacerbate tbe already existing fear
that the allegations may become the subject
of office gossip and, thus, discourage report-
ing even further. And unlike the union rep-
resentative in that situation, tbe coworker rep-
resentative is not constrained by any legal or
political representational duties.
The employer could certainly encourage
the representative to be discreet, but any ex-
press restrictions on disclosure may impede
the objectives ofthe Weingarten right, as dis-
cussion may be necessary to determine
whether discipline was warranted and fairly
meted out. At most, however, the addition
ofthe representative gives knowledge about
the investigation to an additional person who
may breach confidentiality. Currently, noth-
ing prevents the acctised from disclosing the
accusations of harassnient, except his own
desire for privacy. A union representative
could also disclose such information without
legal ramifications unless the representative
owed a duty to the victim as a member of
the same bargaining unit and the publica-
tion established arbitraiy^ or discriminatory
treatment of the victim. Nevertheless, the
inhibiting effect of additional exposure
might warrant Board approval ofa require-
ment that the representative agree not to dis-
close anything learned in the course ofthe
meeting unless it was necessary to assist the
accused in his defense. While such an agree-
ment might lead to additional litigation, it
seems warranted to accommodate the Title
VII interest in eliminating sexual harassnient
with the Section 7 right to make common
catise with coworkers to avoid arbitrary and
unfair employer treatment.
CONCLUSION
Since the NLRB's decision in Fpilepsy Founda-
tion, the presidential election has resulted in
another significant change in Board member-
ship. Civen prior shifts in the law regarding
nonunion employee representation rights, an-
other change may be in the offing. If not, when
applying Fpilepsy Foundation, the Board should
consider the distortions in the mirror when
Weingarten rights are applied in the nonunion
sector. To enstire that the decision accom-
plishes its purpose of providing nonunion
employees with assistance in an interview and
protecting employees from unjust discipline
without intixiding unnecessarily on manage-
ment prerogatives, the Board must modify the
doctrine to take into account the differences
between union and nonunion workplaces. •
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